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IS OSHA UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
Cass R. Sunstein*
INTRODUCTION

JMAGINE that Congress creates a federal agency to deal with a
Ilarge problem, one that involves a significant part of the national
economy. Suppose that Congress instructs the agency: Do what you
believe is best. Act reasonably and appropriately.Adopt the legal
standardthat you prefer, all things considered. Suppose, finally, that
these instructions lack clear contextual referents, such as previous
enactments or judicial understandings,' on which the agency might
build.
If the nondelegation doctrine exists, as the Supreme Court proclaims,2 then this hypothesized statute would seem to violate it. After all, the Court has not overruled or even questioned its decision
in the Schechter Poultry case, striking down the National Industrial
Recovery Act.' On the contrary, the Court has continued to insist
on the need for an "intelligible principle" by which to limit the exercise of agency discretion.4 Remarkably, however, the core provision of one of the nation's most important regulatory statutes-the
Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA")-is not easy to
distinguish from the hypothesized statute.
That provision defines an "occupational safety and health standard" as one that is "reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment."5

* Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I am grateful to Robert
Hahn, Eric Posner, Adrian Vermeule, and Stephen Williams for valuable comments
on a previous draft.
Contextual referents are emphasized in Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally,
337 F.Supp. 737, 748 (D.D.C. 1971) ("[T]he Court has made clear that the standards
of a statute are not to be tested in isolation and derive meaningful content from the
purpose of the Act, its factual background, and the statutory context." (internal quotations omitted)).
2
See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001); Indus. Union
Dep't v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 672 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
3
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935).
4Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 472; Am. Petrol., 448 U.S. at 685-86.
'29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (2000).
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When the Secretary of Labor issues regulations governing tractors,
ladders, or electrical equipment, the only question to be asked is
whether one or another standard is "reasonably necessary or appropriate." Notably, this language appears in a mere definitional
clause, not in a separate substantive provision instructing the Secretary what, exactly, he is supposed to consider in deciding what to
do. Nor is the agency required to do whatever is "necessary,"
strictly speaking, in order to provide safe employment; its duty is
softened, in the sense that it is told to do what is "reasonablynecessary." In fact, the agency is not even required to do that. Apparently it is permitted to reject what is "reasonably necessary" and
instead to select what is merely "appropriate." And how does the
agency decide what counts as either "reasonably necessary" or
"appropriate"?
Suppose that the agency chooses to proceed in strict accordance
with cost-benefit analysis, treating that form of analysis as its rule
of decision. Is it permitted to do that, on the ground that what is
"reasonably necessary" or "appropriate" is whatever cost-benefit
analysis counsels?' Or suppose that the agency treats cost-benefit
analysis as relevant but not conclusive, on the ground that (say)
$800 million in monetized safety benefits to workers justifies an
expenditure of $900 million on the part of employers-an expense
that could result in increased prices, decreased wages, or decreased
employment. Would that approach be lawful? Or suppose that the
agency rejects cost-benefit analysis altogether and decides to require employers to eliminate all "significant" risks (however defined) to the extent "feasible" (whatever that means). Is there anything in the "reasonably necessary or appropriate" language to
foreclose that approach?
It is tempting to respond that the constitutional problem would
be solved if the agency adopted subsidiary policies to discipline its
own discretion For example, the agency might conclude that notwithstanding the vagueness of the statutory language, the best way
6 For

a theoretical argument in support of cost-benefit analysis, see Matthew D.

Adler & Eric A. Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis (2006).
'This strategy is suggested in Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp.
737, 758 (D.D.C. 1971) ("Another feature that blunts the 'blank check' rhetoric is the
requirement that any action taken by the Executive ... must be in accordance with
further standards as developed by the Executive.").
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to proceed is through a strict cost-benefit test. But in 2001, the Supreme Court squarely rejected the idea that a nondelegation problem can be cured by policy judgments at the agency level.8 In the
process-and this is the major difficulty and my motivation for posing the central question here-the Court eviscerated the rationale
of the court of appeals decision that had upheld the "reasonably
necessary or appropriate" language against constitutional attack.9
And because of the sheer breadth of the agency's power, extending
to essentially all of America's workers, the nondelegation objection
is especially acute under the Court's own analysis.' °
It is true that a narrowing construction from federal courts can
rescue a statute from a nondelegation challenge," but the question
remains: what would be the content of any such narrowing construction, if it is to qualify as a construction rather than simple policymaking? The broadest difficulty is that with the "reasonably necessary or appropriate" language, Congress appears, at least at first
glance, to have made no decision at all about the substantive standard under which the Secretary of Labor is supposed to proceed. A
reader might be tempted to conclude that Congress has said,
"make things better," without giving the Secretary guidance about
how, exactly, he is to go about accomplishing that task.
One of my central aims here is to explore the nondelegation
problem in one of the few settings in federal law in which that
problem seems real. 2 But the discussion is also meant to shed light
on some pressing questions for both regulatory policy and administrative law. Over 5000 Americans die each year in the workplace, 3
and more than 4,000,000 are injured or sickened by the conditions

'See Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 472 ("We have never suggested that an agency can
cure an unlawful delegation of legislative power by adopting in its discretion a limiting
construction of the statute.").
9
UAW v. OSHA (UAW II), 37 F.3d 665,668 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
'0See Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 475 (emphasizing importance of breadth of delegation).
" See Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980) ("A construction of the statute that avoids this kind of open-ended grant should certainly be
favored.").
12 After American Trucking, 531 U.S. 457, it seems clear that the Court has little
interest in reviving the nondelegation doctrine as a general rule. See infra Section I.C.
" See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Fatal Occupational Injuries by
Event or Exposure, 2001-2006 (2007), http://www.bis.gov/news.release/cfoi.t01.htm.
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of their employment. Surely steps could be taken to reduce these
deaths, injuries, and illnesses. Under the statutory language, the
Secretary is required to make a wide range of choices about what,
if anything, to demand of American employers and how, if at all, to
protect American workers. The agency should do far better than it
does. 5 But what are the legal limits on its authority? Is the agency
entitled to do nothing at all? Is it entitled to be aggressive, even
draconian? Lurking questions involve consistency and transparency. Suppose that one OSHA regulation protects a large number
of lives at relatively low cost, while another regulation protects a
small number of lives at a relatively high cost. "6 Suppose too that
the agency's explanations for its decisions are often opaque, so that
it is hard to understand why the agency chose one level of regulation rather than another and how the agency sets its own priorities.
Can anything be done, before or within the agency or in courts, to
ensure against crazy-quilt patterns? Might it be possible to ensure a
degree of accountability, rather than a technocratic smokescreen or
fog?
As we shall see, there are three possible solutions to these problems. The most aggressive would be to strike down the "reasonably
necessary or appropriate" language on constitutional grounds. A
possible attraction of this approach is that it would inevitably trigger a democratic debate about the proper content of occupational
safety and health policy-a debate that would in all likelihood be
more sophisticated and constructive than the crude discussion, over
thirty years ago, that initially produced OSHA.17 On the other
hand, courts have been reluctant to invoke the nondelegation doctrine to strike down federal legislation, and for exceedingly good

14 Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Nonfatal
Occuptational Injury
and Illness Incidence Rates 2 (2005), http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/osh/os/osbl003.pdf.
" A dated but still relevant study is Thomas 0. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro,
Workers At Risk: The Failed Promise of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (1993).
6 This does in fact seem to be the pattern. See Stephen G. Breyer et al., Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy 26-27 (6th ed. 2006).
" For an outline of the original statute, written near the time of its enactment, see
David P. Currie, OSHA, 1976 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 1107; for an excellent discussion of the policy dilemmas and of how (poorly) the statute handles them, see Susan
Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law and Economics-and the New Administrative
Law, 98 Yale L.J. 341, 358-64 (1988).
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reasons. 8 A decision to invalidate OSHA would send shock waves
through the federal regulatory state, and courts should hesitate before doing that.
The least aggressive approach, rooted in the Avoidance Canon,
would be to respond to the apparent vagueness of the statutory
language by making a serious effort to use that language to create
floors and ceilings on agency action. Such an effort might plausibly
yield three principles. First, the statute requires the agency to regulate serious or significant risks; second, it forbids the agency from
regulating small or trivial risks; and third, it requires the agency to
respect the constraints of feasibility. As we shall see, judicial insistence on these three requirements would not answer all of the concerns of those attracted to the nondelegation objection, but they
would go a long way in that direction, while significantly improving
the operation of the statutory scheme.
A third approach, and in the end the most attractive, would be
to construe the "reasonably necessary or appropriate" language to
mandate some form of cost-benefit balancing. On a plausible view,
a regulation is not "reasonably necessary" if the benefits do not justify the costs, and the word "appropriate" plainly suggests balancing. One version of this approach would require the agency to use
cost-benefit analysis as the rule of decision, so that regulations
could go forward only if the monetized benefits exceed the
monetized costs. But in the context of workplace safety, where distributional concerns are obviously relevant, a strict monetary test
would run into serious problems. A softened and preferable version would require the Secretary to calculate both costs and benefits and to find a "reasonable relationship" between the two. 9 An
approach of this general kind is probably the best response to the
nondelegation challenge, and it would also have the important vir-

, The most valuable discussion is Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1721, 1721-24 (2002) (challenging the
nondelegation doctrine on originalist and welfarist grounds); see also Richard B.
Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 323, 325-28 (1987) (arguing
that the nondelegation doctrine is not administrable by federal judges). My goal here
is not to evaluate the legitimacy or value of the nondelegation doctrine. Instead, I
take the doctrine as a given for purposes of discussion.
9
Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 667 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
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tue of promoting both transparency and coherence in occupational
safety policy.
It is true that any cost-benefit reading would raise serious questions about the application of these principles to the distinctive
context of occupational safety. The most important of these questions involves distributional issues: how should the agency proceed
if the costs exceed the benefits but workers are nonetheless significant winners on balance? I will offer some brief suggestions about
how such questions might be answered. The basic conclusion is that
the agency should not be permitted to proceed if the costs dwarf
the benefits, but that as a matter of law, substantial gains to workers should be sufficient to justify regulation even if the monetary
value of those gains is below the aggregate costs.
I. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY, OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH, AND
DELEGATION

To understand the constitutional issue, it is necessary to explore
a complex line of cases. Notably, no one has challenged OSHA
regulations on constitutional grounds since 1994.20 But rulings since
that time place the constitutional problem in sharp relief. The central problem is that the Supreme Court's latest pronouncements,
apparently designed to restrict the use of the nondelegation doctrine, eliminate the existing line of defense for the "reasonably
necessary or appropriate" language.2
A. Benzene
The constitutional debate over OSHA began quite unexpectedly
in 1980, when the Supreme Court in American Petroleum resolved
a challenge to the Secretary of Labor's effort to limit benzene exposure." In that case, no constitutional objection was explicitly
raised by the parties. Instead the Court was asked to answer what
turned out to be a surprisingly difficult question of statutory construction: when the Secretary is regulating carcinogens under
OSHA, what is the legal standard?' To answer that question, the
20See UAW v. OSHA (UAW II), 37 F.3d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
21Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).

Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
2Id. at 611.
2
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Court had to deal with two independent provisions. The first included the "reasonably necessary or appropriate" language. The
second was the provision more specifically governing toxic substances and harmful physical agents, which reads:
The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic
materials or harmful physical agents under this subsection, shall
set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent
feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard
24
dealt with by such standard for the period of his working life.
One of the Court's key tasks was to reconcile the "reasonably
necessary or appropriate" language, which applies to all occupational safety and health standards, with the "no employee will suffer" language, which is limited to standards involving "toxic materials or harmful physical agents." The Court had three principal
options. First, it could have said that the two provisions, taken together, call for some form of cost-benefit analysis. Perhaps a standard is not "reasonably necessary or appropriate" unless the benefits exceed the costs; perhaps a standard is not "feasible" if the
costs are high and the benefits are low. Second, the Court could
have said, as the government vigorously urged,25 that the Secretary
of Labor is forbidden from regulating on the basis of cost-benefit
analysis. Instead, she must regulate to the point of (economic and
technological) feasibility whenever at least one "employee will suffer material impairment" as a result of exposure. Third, the Court
could have said that the Secretary could regulate a risk only if it
rose to a certain level of significance, in the sense that a statistically
small risk (1 in 1 million? 1 in 100 million? 1 in 500 million?) would
not justify regulatory controls.
Each of these positions attracted support within the Court. In a
concurring opinion, Justice Powell favored a form of cost-benefit
balancing. He would require the agency "to determine that the
economic effects of its standard" bore "a reasonable relationship to
the expected benefits."26 In his view, a standard is neither "rea2429

U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2000).

"Am. Petrol., 448 U.S. at 639, 641.
26Id. at 667 (Powell, J., concurring).
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sonably necessary" nor "feasible" if the expenditures are "wholly
disproportionate to the expected health and safety benefits."" This
conclusion makes some intuitive sense, but as a matter of interpretation, it runs into evident problems. The toxic materials provision
governs benzene, and that provision requires the Secretary to set
the standard that "most adequately assures.., that no employee
will suffer material impairment of health." Suppose that a regulation would cost $900 million but would save five workers from
"material impairment of health." On standard assumptions about
the monetary valuation of human life,' such a regulation would
impose costs that are disproportionate to benefits. But under the
statutory language, the agency must nonetheless ensure "that no
employee will suffer," and hence it would be required to proceed
even if the monetized costs greatly exceed the monetized benefits.
To be sure, the word "feasible" operates as a firm limit on what
the Secretary might do. No regulation may be issued if it is not
"feasible." But in light of the structure of the sentence, "feasible"
means practicable in the sense of capable of being done; it does not
entail cost-benefit balancing. If "feasible" referred to cost-benefit
balancing, it would be inconsistent with the "no employee will suffer" language, because a cost-benefit test would allow a number of
employees to "suffer." And so the Court ruled in a subsequent decision, drawing on the ordinary meaning and structure of the statute to suggest that feasible means "practicable."29 I shall turn
shortly to some evident puzzles here, involving the meaning of feasibility.'
In a dissenting opinion commanding four votes in American Petroleum, Justice Marshall adopted the second position, urged by
the government in defense of the benzene regulation.31 He con27Id.

"'Thevalue of a statistical life is now considered to be in the general vicinity of $6
million, though that figure is highly controversial. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of
Fear:
29 Beyond the Precautionary Principle 132 (2006).
Am. Textile Mfr. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 508-09 (1981). To be sure, this
idea raises questions of its own. What, exactly, does it mean for a standard to be
"practicable?" Suppose that some percentage of affected businesses would fail if the
regulation were imposed. What percentage would be high enough to make the regulation no longer feasible?
30See infra Subsection II.B.2.
Am. Petrol., 448 U.S. at 688 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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tended that the toxic materials provision, with its "no employee
will suffer" language, imposed no requirement that the agency
show a risk to be significant, in the sense of exceeding a certain statistical threshold. In his view, the specific provision governing toxic
substances must prevail over the more general "reasonably necessary or appropriate" language." Carefully parsing the text and legislative history, Justice Marshall insisted that the agency was not
required to quantify the risk to establish that it rose to a level of
significance.3
The Court's plurality disagreed. Its key argument was that a
standard would not count as "reasonably necessary and appropriate" unless it would serve to eliminate a "significant risk" of harm.'
The plurality struggled to defend its interpretation by reference to
the statutory text and history, 5 and it conspicuously failed to come
to terms with the "no employee will suffer" requirement, which
seemed to suggest that a statistically small risk (say, one in two million) would trigger regulatory controls if the risk would produce
death or serious injury in a few employees. Lacking a clear anchor
in the standard legal materials, 6 the plurality pointed instead to
what it saw as the unfortunate implication of Justice Marshall's
reading, which would "give OSHA power to impose enormous
costs that might produce little, if any, discernible benefit."37 Here
the Court seemed to suggest a background principle for use in construing risk-reduction statutes: In the face of doubt, such statutes
should not be interpreted to authorize the government to impose
substantialburdensfor trivial gains."
To this, the plurality added an explicit nondelegation concern: if
the statute did not require the risk to "be quantified sufficiently to
enable the Secretary to characterize it as significant in an understandable way," it might be unconstitutional. In the plurality's
view, courts should favor a "construction... that avoids this kind
32

Id. at 709.

3Id. at 713-15.
Petrol., 448 U.S. at 639.
Id. at 639-52.
36
See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance,
37 2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 223,244-46.
Am. Petrol., 448 U.S. at 645.
38See the discussion in Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 Mich.
L. Rev. 1651, 1664 (2001).
35 Am.
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of open-ended grant."39 Citing Schechter Poultry, the Court thus
suggested a nondelegation canon to the effect that courts should
favor a construction that grants an agency bounded rather than
unbounded authority.' The basic idea is a variation on, or a specification of, the more general Avoidance Canon, which asks courts
to avoid serious constitutional issues unless Congress has explicitly
raised them.4 ' If Congress intends to grant an agency open-ended
authority, to an extent that raises serious nondelegation concerns,
it must make its will plain. 2
For my current purpose-exploring the constitutional vulnerability of OSHA-the key opinion came from then-Justice
Rehnquist. "3 He contended that the governing provisions amounted
to "a legislative mirage, appearing to some Members but not to
others, and assuming any form desired by the beholder."' In his
view, the words "to the extent feasible" rendered 5the toxic substances provision "largely, if not entirely, precatory."
Justice Rehnquist did not argue that a nondelegation problem
would arise if Justice Powell were correct; a requirement of costbenefit balancing hardly offends the Constitution.' Nor did Justice
Rehnquist argue that if Congress meant to enact the interpretation
favored by the plurality, the statute would create any constitutional
problem. If Congress instructed an agency to regulate all "significant risks" to the point of "feasibility," the agency would retain
considerable discretion but not to an extent that would violate the
nondelegation doctrine. And while the plurality suggested that
the government's interpretation would be constitutionally trouble39
Am. Petrol., 448 U.S. at 646.
40See Manning, supra note 36,

4, See,
42

43

at 223.
e.g. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S 116, 130 (1958).

Id at 129-30.

Am. Petrol., 448 U.S. at 671.
"Id. at 681.
41 Id. at
681-82.
4 Cost-benefit analysis does, of course, require agencies to make a number of supplemental judgments to render balancing operational. See W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal
Tradeoffs: Public and Private Responsibilities for Risk 17-32 (1992) (discussing
methods for valuing life). For a critique, see Lisa Heinzerling & Frank Ackerman,
Priceless 10-11 (2006) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis is based on incoherent
methodology and amounts to a broad grant of discretion to those who must give it
content).
41See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457,
473 (2001).
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some, Justice Rehnquist did not make that claim. That claim is
hard to take seriously in light of the Court's past willingness to uphold broad grants of discretion to regulatory agencies. Surely Congress holds the constitutional power to require aggressive and costblind regulation of workplace risks, whether or not the underlying
risks can be shown to be significant. For nondelegation purposes,
there is all the difference in the world between a draconian statute,
which tells an agency to impose stringent regulation, and an openended statute, which asks an agency to select its own standard. Justice Rehnquist essentially urged that so long as the nondelegation
doctrine exists, Congress must make some choice among the three
principal interpretive possibilities. If it has failed to do so-if all
courts have is a "mirage"-then any intelligible principle must be
supplied by the agency itself, in violation of the Constitution.
Eight members of the Court disagreed with Justice Rehnquist,
not on the ground that the italicized claim is wrong, but on the
ground that Congress did, in fact, make the relevant choice. For
present purposes, the larger point is that the division within the
Court raises an obvious question. Suppose the toxic substances
provision is not involved and that the agency is guided only by the
"reasonably necessary or appropriate" language. How, if at all,
would the agency be constrained? The question is far from fanciful,
because much of the agency's work does not involve toxic substances. Hence the more specific provision, with its "no employee
will suffer" and "to the extent feasible" language, does not seem to
be applicable at all.
B. Safety Standards,Health Standards,and the New Nondelegation
Doctrine
1. The Challenge
The issue of legal constraints on agency discretion under OSHA
reached the court of appeals in 1991.4' The case involved the
agency's regulation of industrial equipment that might move suddenly and hence produce injuries. The regulation required two
procedures: "lockout" and "tagout." With "lockout," certain
equipment must be locked so as to ensure that no movement can

, UAW v. OSHA (UAW I), 938 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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occur. With "tagout," a plastic warning must be placed on equipment, informing workers that the equipment should not be operated unless the tag is removed. In issuing the regulation, the agency
said that the toxic substances provision was inapplicable and that it
was governed only by the "reasonably necessary or appropriate"
language.49 In the agency's view, the statute drew a sharp distinction between "safety standards" and "health standards," and the
more stringent "no employee shall suffer" provision was applicable
only to the latter.0
Challenging the agency's position, the United Auto Workers argued that the toxic substances provision did apply and hence that
the agency must apply the "significant risk/feasibility" framework
established in American Petroleum. Noting that the toxic substances provision included a reference to "harmful physical
agents," the United Auto Workers contended that this provision
literally applies to dangerous equipment. The court responded that
this argument was a form of sophistry. 1 In its view, Congress
seemed to have drawn a distinction between health risks and safety
risks. To support this point, the court noted that the phrase "harmful physical agents" appeared in a separate provision that seemed
to involve health ("toxic substances or other harmful agents")
rather than safety; it concluded that, at the very least, the agency
could reasonably conclude that the toxic substances provision applied only to health standards. 2
The court's conclusion meant that, in issuing safety standards,
the Secretary was governed only by the "reasonably necessary or
appropriate" provision. With the background provided by Justice
Rehnquist's opinion in American Petroleum, the National Association of Manufacturers challenged that provision as an unconstitutional delegation. In responding to that challenge, the agency outlined its understanding of its statutory authority. 3 It agreed that it
would have to establish a "significant risk." It added that it could
not regulate beyond the point that was "both technologically and
economically feasible." But it did not treat feasibility as a floor; it
49
1Id. at
50

Id.

1313.

5'Id at 1314.
52Id. at 1314-15.
Id. at 1317.
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could, if it chose, regulate far less aggressively. In the court's
words, "[t]he upshot is an asserted power, once significant risk is
found, to require precautions that take the industry to the verge of
economic ruin.., or to do nothing at all."'
The court acknowledged that, because agency standards must be
applied across broad categories, the agency could not punish particular companies that it did not like. Hence a central nondelegation concern, involving favoritism, was reduced. Nonetheless, some
potentially "dangerous favoritism" remained, since stringent standards might come down especially hard on small firms and favor
large ones. 5 Thus the agency's understanding "would give the executive branch untrammeled power to dictate the vitality and even
survival of whatever segments of American business it might
choose."56 The court emphasized that the agency's discretion covered all of American enterprise, not a single industry, and that the
delegation did not involve a power particularly conferred on the
president, such as the power over foreign policy."
How might the nondelegation problem be cured? Emphasizing
the importance of predictability and the rule of law, the court's
evident preference was for a narrowing construction by the agency,
perhaps involving a form of cost-benefit analysis. 8 Evidently, the
court believed that a key purpose of the nondelegation doctrine is
to control agency discretion, and that if the agency committed itself
to cost-benefit analysis, the constitutional problem would be
solved. In other words, the agency might supply the requisite "intelligible principle" on its own and in that way overcome the nondelegation challenge. Indeed, the court insisted that cost-benefit
analysis would be compatible with statutory text and history. 9 The
word "reasonably" suggests balancing, which is associated with the
"reasonable man" standard in tort law.' Unfortunately, the court
did not acknowledge that the word "reasonably" modifies "necessary," and hence the statute failed to impose a freestanding obliga4Id.
5
56 Id.

at 1318.

Id.
7Id.

5

'Id.

at 1319 ("Cost-benefit analysis is certainly consistent with the language of

§ 3(8).").
Id.
'oId.
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tion to be "reasonable," apparently posing a problem for the costbenefit interpretation. But the statutory phrase is "reasonably necessary or appropriate," and surely the word "appropriate" could
(reasonably) be understood to entail cost-benefit balancing. Thus
the court refused to strike down the statute, emphasizing that it
could be interpreted to allow such balancing and could therefore
be construed to be constitutional.61
2. The Agency's Response
On remand, the agency declined the court's invitation to construe the statute to require cost-benefit balancing.62 It did, however,
attempt to bind itself through an assortment of intelligible principles. Thus
the agency listed six principles that would limit its dis61
cretion:
The risk must be significant.
Compliance must be economically feasible.
Compliance must be technologically feasible.
The standard must use the most cost-effective measures.
The agency must explain its adoption of a standard departing
from any national consensus standard.
The agency must explain its standard by reference to record evidence and also explain any inconsistency with prior agency practice.
The court of appeals thought that by themselves, these principles
were not sufficient to rescue OSHA's "reasonably necessary or appropriate" language, because they gave the agency too much room
to "roam" between different levels of stringency.' But the agency
added a final criterion. Looking at various other sections, the
agency said that it must "provide a high degree of employee protection," moving close to the point of feasibility.65 Because the
agency could "deviate only modestly from the stringency" required
by the health standards, the court said that the agency's approach
imposed sufficient discipline to rescue the statute from nondelega61 Id.

at 1321.
UAW v. OSHA (UAW II), 37 F.3d 665,669 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
63Id. at 668.
62

64Id. at 669.
65Id.

(quotation omitted).
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tion attack.' The central idea seemed to be that once a significant
risk was shown, the agency would regulate at least close to the
point of feasibility. The agency was therefore bound by a set of
constraints that amounted, as a whole, to the equivalent of the requisite intelligible principle; the nondelegation problem was therefore cured.
The court's rationale here raises some immediate questions:
What does "feasibility" mean? When, exactly, does regulation become so stringent that it is no longer "feasible" to comply with it?
If a regulation is expensive, it is likely to endanger at least one or a
few firms. Is such a regulation not "feasible" for that reason? Or,
are massive business failures required? If the agency says the latter,
then it faces an evident problem: under that approach, any particular regulation might move industry to the brink of massive business
failures, and that step might make other regulations impossible to
absorb even if they are relatively inexpensive. In practice, the
agency cannot possibly choose numerous regulations, each of
which puts whole industries on the brink of failure. A great deal of
additional work would be helpful to understand actual agency
practice in light of the feasibility condition and to determine what
the appropriate legal constraints on that practice should be. For
present purposes, the key point is that because of the agency's emphasis on the need for stringency, the court of appeals found that
the nondelegation objection was answered.
C. The Dead Nondelegation Doctrine
The court of appeals holdings just discussed suggest a simple
principle: If a statute is an unconstitutionaldelegation as written, it
can nonetheless be saved as a result of subsidiarypolicymaking by
the agency in the form of a narrowing construction, even if that construction is merely optional in light of the standardsources of statutory interpretation.This principle amounts to a new nondelegation
doctrine. But in 2001, the Supreme Court unambiguously rejected
that doctrine in American Trucking.67
The case tested the meaning and validity of a key provision of
the Clean Air Act, one that appears similar to the "reasonably
66Id.
67Whitman

v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472-73 (2001).
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necessary or appropriate" phrase. That provision asks the EPA to
issue national ambient air quality standard to the point "requisite
to protect the public health."' Building on its OSHA decisions, the
court of appeals held that the statutory phrase was an unconstitutional delegation because it lacked an intelligible principle.69 What
counts as "requisite"? The court thought that Congress had not answered that question. "Here it is as though Congress commanded
EPA to select 'big guys,' and EPA announced that it would evaluate candidates based on height and weight, but revealed no cut-off
point. ,70
At the same time, the court said that the EPA could issue a narrowing construction that would save the statute from constitutional
attack. In the key sentence, the court said that "an agency wielding
the power over American life possessed by EPA should be capable
of developing the rough equivalent of a generic unit of harm that
takes into account population affected, severity and probability."7
Unlike in the OSHA cases, the court ruled that the statutory term
explicitly banned the agency from basing its decisions on costbenefit analysis.72 But the agency would be permitted, and indeed
required, to act in accordance with some kind of quantitative benefits analysis, requiring regulation when the benefits reached a certain magnitude and forbidding regulation when the benefits did not
reach that magnitude.73
The Supreme Court rejected this approach.7 4 First, it held that a
narrowing construction by the agency was neither here nor there.
The nondelegation doctrine is rooted in Article 1, Section 1, and in
the Court's view, its purpose is therefore to require that laws are
made by the national legislature.7 6 It follows that agency selfbinding is irrelevant. The intelligible principle must come from

42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2000).
"Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
70
Id.
71Id. at 1039.
7 Id. at 1038 ("Cost-benefit analysis ... is not available ....
.
Id. at 1039-40.
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).
Id. at 473. ("Whether the statute delegates legislative power is a question for the
courts, and an agency's voluntary self-denial has no bearing upon the answer.").
76On some serious complexities here, see Posner & Vermeule, supra note 18, at
1729-32.
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Congress itself. If Congress has given an agency a blank check, it
does not matter if that agency chooses to narrow its discretion, certainly if the narrowing is based on the agency's own policy judgments.
Second, the Court held that the statute, as written, was not an
unconstitutional delegation." National ambient air quality standards must be set at the level that is "requisite to protect the public
health." This requirement means that such standards must be "sufficient, but not more than necessary."78 In the Court's view, that
constraint is sufficient to overcome the nondelegation problem.
The Court did emphasize that the nondelegation issue would be
analyzed by reference to the scope of the agency's power, which
was certainly broad in this case, covering as it did a wide assortment of industries; but the EPA's discretion was far from uncabined by the statutory language. 9
At first glance, the Court's analysis on this last point seems
hopelessly unsatisfying: how is the word "necessary" a useful limitation on agency discretion? The objection of the lower court appears unanswered: does this provision not grant the agency the discretion to proceed as stringently as it wishes, without imposing any
kind of floor and ceiling? But perhaps the Court's conclusion is not
as unhelpful as it seems. A national ambient air quality standard
could be characterized as more aggressive than "necessary," and
therefore as unlawful, if it delivered benefits that are trivial or exceedingly small, or if it regulated risks that do not concern ordinary
people in ordinary life. As Justice Breyer wrote, the statute "does
not require the EPA to eliminate every health risk, however slight,
at any economic cost, however great."' In his view, the statute does
not authorize the agency to eliminate all risk-"an impossible and
undesirable objective."8 What counts as requisite to protect the
public health will "vary with background circumstances, such as the
public's ordinary tolerance of the particular health risk in the particular context at issue."' Thus the agency should consider "the se"Am.
Trucking, 531 U.S. at 476.
8
Id.at 473 (quotation omitted).
7'Id. at 475-76.
' Id. at 494 (Breyer, J., concurring).
81Id.

" Id.
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verity of a pollutant's potential adverse health effects, the number
of those likely to be affected, the distribution of the adverse effects,
and the uncertainties surrounding each estimate."83
It follows from these remarks that some imaginable restrictions
would violate the statute because they would go beyond the point
that is "requisite." Equally important, it also follows that a national
standard could be characterized as less aggressive than "necessary"
if it left unaddressed a residual risk that was, in fact, significant.'
Suppose that in light of the pollutant's adverse effects and the
number of people at risk, the EPA's standard was inexplicably lenient. We should conclude that such leniency would be unlawful
because it would
85 fall short of the level "requisite to protect the
public health.,
It is possible to go further. If Justice Breyer's analysis is put together with the Court's, then the EPA's task may not be radically
different from what was sought by the court of appeals. That is, the
agency may have to devise "the rough equivalent of a generic unit
of harm that takes into account population affected, severity and
probability."' Without some kind of generic unit of harm, it might
not be possible for the agency to give an adequate explanation of
why any particular regulation is more stringent or less stringent
than necessary.' And to this extent, the simple words "requisite to
protect the public health" do establish both floors and ceilings on
agency action.
To reach this conclusion, courts might rely on the text, simple
and brief though it is, and need not engage in any especially aggressive form of statutory construction (as the Supreme Court did
in American Petroleum). The statutory terms in the relevant provi83

Id. at 495.
is relevant here that, in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court held that an agency's

84It

failure to respond to a petition to make rules is subject to judicial review. 127 S. Ct.
1438, 1459 (2007). Thus if an agency refuses to make a rule in the face of a petition
asking for one, courts might view the agency's refusal as unlawful. The Clean Air Act
sets out conditions under which the EPA must regulate. For discussion, see Am. Lung
Ass'n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
5
Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 496 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Am. Lung Ass'n,
134 F.3d at 392 (requiring EPA to explain failure to issue short-term standard for
asthmatics in light of evidence that a new standard would eliminate significant harm).
Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
But see Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 283 F.3d 355, 362 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (applying
deferential review to ozone and particulates standards).
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sion of the Clean Air Act are plausibly taken to invite floors and
ceilings and do so while forbidding the agency from engaging in
cost-benefit balancing. We shall shortly see how this analysis applies to OSHA.'
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM

A. OSHA's Unnoticed Vulnerability
My principal topic is the meaning and validity of the "reasonably
necessary or appropriate" clause in OSHA. It will be useful, however, to begin with a brief overview of the agency's practice.
1. Agency Practice:A Glance
Since 1994, OSHA safety regulations have not been challenged
on nondelegation grounds, but the agency has nonetheless issued a
number of such regulations. In explaining those regulations, the
agency has typically offered an account of the "pertinent legal authority," which refers to the "reasonably necessary or appropriate"
language. 9 In what has become a kind of boilerplate, cutting across
Republican and Democratic administrations, the agency has explained that a regulation satisfies that standard
if it substantially reduces or eliminates significant risk, and is economically feasible, technologically feasible, cost effective, consistent with prior Agency action or supported by a reasoned justification for departing from prior Agency actions, supported by
substantial evidence, and is better able to effectuate the Act's
purposes than any national consensus standard it supersedes.'
A standard counts as economically feasible "if industry can absorb or pass on the cost of compliance without threatening its long
term profitability or competitive structure."'" A standard counts as
cost-effective "if the protective measures it requires are the least
costly of the available alternatives that achieve the same level of

' See infra Subsection II.B.2.
89See, e.g., Occupational Exposure to 1,3-Butadiene, 61 Fed. Reg. 56,746, 56,748
(Nov. 4, 1996).
' See, e.g., id.
91Id.
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protection."' In addition, safety standards "must be highly protec' The words "highly protective"
tive."93
are not themselves defined,
but they are a clear bow in the direction of the holding in the UAW
H case.
What does all this mean? Some of it means nothing at all, or at
least nothing that bears on the question at hand. Under existing
administrative law doctrine, all agency decisions must be either
consistent with past action or a "justified" departure.94 That requirement does not come from OSHA, and it is irrelevant to a
nondelegation challenge. It is true that under OSHA, any regulation must be supported by substantial evidence,95 but the requirement of record evidence is hardly sufficient to respond to a nondelegation objection, which points to an absence of statutory
standards. Nor is any help provided by the idea that any regulation
must be "better able to effectuate the Act's purposes" than the
standard that it supersedes. This idea merely replicates the idea
that a departure must be "justified," and by itself, a reference to
"the Act's purposes" tells us exactly nothing about what those purposes are.
It follows that the agency's understanding can be reduced to
three ideas: (1) the risk must be significant; (2) the regulation must
be feasible; and (3) within the continuum bounded at one end by
very lenient and at the other by the constraint of feasibility, the
agency will choose a regulation that is "highly protective. 9 6 As I
have noted, the word "feasible" is itself ambiguous.97 No on/off
switch separates the "feasible" from the "infeasible." Inevitably,
the agency is exercising some discretion in deciding exactly how
aggressive to be.
It is true that in assessing significant risk, the regulations often
refer to the passage in American Petroleum that estimated a significant mortality risk as somewhere above one-in-a-billion, with a
suggestion that one-in-a-thousand could surely qualify as signifi-

9'Id.
93
Id.
9 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42
(1983).
" 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (2000).
96Occupational Exposure to 1,3-Butadiene, 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,748.
17 See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying
text.
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cant." For most of its standards, OSHA calculates the significance
of a risk in exactly these terms: it determines the rate of death per
1000 workers, assuming a 45-year work life.' If the risk of death is
at or above 1 per 1000, it qualifies as significant."° As early as 1987,
the agency said that a risk of over 1.64 per 1000 counts as significant'01 and that a risk of 0.6 per 100,000 "may be approaching a
level that can be viewed as safe.""°
But many regulations-and the safety standards in particularexpress significant risk in terms of the magnitudes of annual deaths
and injuries, rather than in terms of deaths per 1000 workers. With
a bit of arithmetic these can be recast in terms of deaths per 1000
workers, 3 and informal calculations reveal that whenever we know
the magnitude of the annual death and injury rate, the risk is
greater than one death per 1000 workers." The two exceptions are
the standard for confined spaces, where the risk is indeterminate
because the size of the workforce is not given, and the standards
for scaffolding, where the risk of death is slightly below 1 per
1000.05
As a general practice, the agency's safety regulations do offer
separate statements of both costs and benefits, but the agency does
not formally compare the monetized benefits to the monetized
Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 655 (1980); see, e.g., Occupational Exposure to 1,3-Butadiene, 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,790-91.
See, e.g., Occupational Exposure to Methylene Chloride, 62 Fed. Reg. 1494, 1562
(Jan.10, 1997).
10Id.
10' Bldg. and Constr. Trades Dep't v. Brock, 828 F.2d 1258, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
12 Occupational Exposure to Formaldehyde, 52 Fed. Reg. 46,168, 46,234 (Dec. 4,

1987).
103

The risk is calculated by dividing deaths by workforce size and multiplying by 45.

See Ergonomics Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 68,262, 68,556 (Nov. 14, 2000).
In the steel erection safety standard, for example, the significant risk was 35
deaths and 2279 serious injuries per year caused by steel erection accidents. According to the standard, 56,840 workers are exposed to the risk. Safety Standards for Steel
Erection, 61 Fed. Reg. 5196, 5199 (Jan. 18, 2001). Using these numbers yields a risk of
approximately 28 per 1000-clearly significant. The ergonomics standard did not attempt to quantify risk in terms of deaths, but the estimated risk of musculoskeletal
disorders or injuries ranged from 33 to 926 cases per 1000 workers, which "are clearly
significant by any reasonable measure." Ergonomics Program, 65 Fed. Reg. at 68,752.
105 Confined Spaces in Construction, 72 Fed. Reg. 67,352, 67,355
(Nov. 28, 2007) (describing a significant risk of approximately 6 fatalities and 1000 injuries per year);
Safety Standards for Scaffolds Used in the Construction Industry, 61 Fed. Reg. 46,026,
46,027 (Aug. 30, 1996).
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costs to calculate "net" benefits. Costs are stated in dollars and
benefits are usually expressed in terms of deaths and injuries prevented. That is, both benefits and costs are quantified, but usually
only costs are monetized. Nonetheless, assuming $6.8 million as the
value of a life (OSHA's preferred figure during this range"°), every
regulation, with one exception,' that claims to prevent deaths is
justified by cost-benefit analysis even without taking injuries into
account.
It is unclear why the agency only rarely explicitly monetizes prevented deaths or injuries, but there is some evidence that the
agency does monetize when the ultimate question is close. For example, the agency monetized the 1.3 annual deaths intended to be
prevented by its electrical installation standard, and then converted
that amount to 2005 dollars, yielding $9.4 million in monetized
benefits. The regulation cost $9.6 million. 8 A proposed standard
governing confined spaces stated monetized benefits of $85 million;
the regulation cost $77 million."° Another case of conspicuous
monetization is the ergonomics standard,"' overturned by Congress."' This standard was unique in that it would have prevented
only injuries and not deaths. The agency calculated the value of the
prevented injuries to be $9.1 billion, with costs of $4.5 billion."2 According to these numbers, the ergonomics standard was not a close
call, but the controversy surrounding the proposed regulation
might well have spurred explicit monetization.

1

"See, e.g. Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg. 10,100,

10,305 (Feb. 28, 2006).
107The exception is Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium. Id. at 10,308.
The cost-benefit analysis in this regulation is extensive, perhaps because it is unclear
whether the regulation is justified on cost-benefit grounds. However, since this is a
health regulation, the agency was required to reduce the risk to the limits of feasibility.
Electrical Standard, 72 Fed. Reg. 7136, 7179 n.60, 7182 (Feb. 14, 2007).
'o Confined Spaces in Construction, 72 Fed. Reg. 67,352, 67,392-93 (Nov. 28, 2007).
Consider also Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg. at
10,308-10, in which the monetized benefits were arguably exceeded by the costs.
"0 Ergonomics Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 68,262 (Nov. 14, 2000).
S.J. Res. 6, 107th Cong. (2001).
"' Ergonomics Program, 65 Fed. Reg. at 68,262.
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2. The SurprisingEffect of American Trucking
The American Trucking decision did not exactly invite greater
use of the nondelegation doctrine. On the contrary, the Court's insouciant approach to the "requisite to protect the public health"
language of the Clean Air Act suggested a noticeable absence of
enthusiasm for the doctrine. Ironically, however, the Court's rejection of the new nondelegation doctrine eliminated the route by
which the court of appeals had upheld the "reasonably necessary
or appropriate" language in OSHA against constitutional attack.
After American Trucking, it is plain that a narrowing construction
by the agency will not save an otherwise unacceptable delegation.
If OSHA is to be rescued from constitutional objection, it must be
because of what the statute says, not because of agency policymaking in the absence of legislative guidance. Recall here the emphasis
in American Trucking on the scope of the agency's power: because
OSHA covers essentially all American workers, the existence of
untrammeled discretion would be a serious problem.
We are now in a position to see the central difficulty. After
American Trucking, everything turns on whether the phrase "reasonably necessary or appropriate" sets out an intelligible principle.
To be sure, the statutory provision would be valid if it could be
treated as analogous to the national ambient air quality provisions
of the Clean Air Act."' As we have seen, the Court upheld the
phrase "requisite to protect the public health" on the ground that it
forbids cost-benefit balancing and calls for a cost-blind inquiry into
how much regulation is "necessary." In the Court's view, that inquiry is not unguided. But there are real difficulties in understanding OSHA to mean the same thing as the Clean Air Act. As construed by the court of appeals, the words "reasonably necessary or
appropriate" are plausibly, but not necessarily, taken to authorize
cost-benefit balancing and thus seem to leave discretion to the Secretary to decide whether the statute requires such analysis or not.
In other words, Congress has not set out an intelligible principle
supporting or rejecting cost-benefit analysis. Whether standards
must be based on that form of analysis is for the agency to decide.
3 Indeed,

the Court in American Trucking did compare the Clean Air Act to

OSHA; however, the comparison did not focus on the "reasonably or appropriate"
language. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001).
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Perhaps this is a fatal defect. Insofar as the words "reasonably necessary or appropriate" are involved, Justice Rehnquist's original
objection seems at least plausible: the agency has been authorized
to choose whatever principle it likes.
To be sure, the very idea of an "intelligible principle" poses its
own difficulties. What, exactly, does that idea mean? The best answer points to the purpose of the nondelegation doctrine, which is
to ensure that Congress, as the national lawmaker, does not grant
blank checks to the executive branch or anyone else."4 If Congress
has set out an intelligible principle, agency discretion is sufficiently
bounded. On this view, it might well be unacceptable for Congress
to tell an agency to do as it chooses or whatever "the public interest requires," unless the notion of the public interest, in context, offers sufficient discipline."5 In this light, it should be clear that the
difference between a principle that is "intelligible" and one that is
not is inevitably a matter of degree. The question becomes how
much discretion is too much discretion-a question that is not easily administered by federal courts. The difficulty of judicial administration is a standard objection to aggressive judicial enforcement
of the nondelegation doctrine, even assuming that it has firm constitutional roots."6 But as the doctrine now stands, it is necessary to
ask how, if at all, OSHA limits the agency's room to "roam."
How might courts respond to this problem? There are three possibilities.
B. Solutions and Proposals
1. Invalidation
The most aggressive approach would be to invalidate the provision on constitutional grounds. To be sure, invalidation would represent the first invocation of the nondelegation doctrine to strike
down a federal statute in over seventy years-and only the third in

On the complexities here, see Posner and Vermeule, supra note 18, at 1725-43.
The Federal Communications Commission is generally controlled only by a test
that refers to the "public convenience, interest, or necessity." 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2000).
For discussion, see Randolph May, The Public Interest Standard: Is it Too Indeterminate to Be Constitutional?, 53 Fed. Comm. L.J. 427,443-52 (2001).
16 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415-16 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing difficulties in judicial implementation of nondelegation doctrine).
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the nation's history."7 In addition, it would send shock waves
through the administrative state. But unlikely as it would seem,
disruptive though it would be, and radical as it would appear, this
approach is not entirely without appeal.
In American Trucking, the Court emphasized that the statutory
phrase "requisite to protect the public health" does not seem more
open-ended than several other statutory phrases that the Court has
upheld against nondelegation attack. As we have seen, the "reasonably necessary or appropriate" clause is plausibly different, because that phrase seems to allow (but not to require) the agency to
use some form of cost-benefit analysis as a rule of decision. It
would therefore be easy to distinguish American Trucking: while
Congress set out an intelligible principle to govern national ambient air quality standards, it failed to do so in the context of occupational safety standards. The basic idea would be that in the relevant
provision of the Clean Air Act, Congress instructed the agency to
engage in a cost-blind analysis of how much protection is "requisite," whereas in OSHA, Congress left the agency at sea.
At the same time, invalidation would force, for the first time, a
sustained legislative encounter with the exceedingly difficult policy
questions raised by occupational safety and health regulation.
When the statute was originally enacted in 1970, Congress did not
seriously grapple with those problems. Instead, it was largely content simply to recognize the existence of a problem and the need
for a regulatory solution."' Since that time, however, public officials have been in a position to learn an immense amount about
regulatory policy. Much of this learning might be brought to bear
on a new enactment. 119 Of course, there is disagreement about how

...
The other two are A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935) and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). In this respect, the
nondelegation doctrine has had only one good year.
118 See Currie, supra note 17, at 1160; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 17, at 360-61.
...
For various perspectives, see Viscusi, supra note 46, at vii-xi; W. Kip Viscusi, Rational Risk Policy 1-4 (1998); Currie, supra note 17, at 1160; Rose-Ackerman, supra
note 17, at 354-60; Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Reorienting OSHA:
Regulatory Alternatives and Legislative Reform, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 62-63 (1989).
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best to incorporate what has been learned,'2" but that is precisely
the question for democratic engagement.
This is not the place for a sustained discussion of regulatory reform in the domain of occupational safety, but a few points might
be helpful. It is now clear, for example, that information disclosure
is sometimes the best response to serious risks. 2' It is plausible to
think that the first line of defense, in the domain of worker safety,
should be a requirement that employers inform employees about
the hazards that they face. 122 In principle, disclosure should create
an incentive to increase safety and at the same time increase the
likelihood that workers will receive a wage premium for the relevant risks. 3 Congress might well instruct OSHA to ensure that
when the workplace exposes workers to risks above a certain
threshold, they must be warned. 4
At the same time, we know a great deal about the limits of disclosure strategies, stemming in part from bounded rationality on
the part of those who must assess risks. 2 ' There is reason to believe

that many workers are "risk optimists," reducing cognitive dissonance by concluding that for them, the workplace is safer than it
actually is. 126 To the extent that this is so, information disclosure

may not work. At the very least, it is necessary to ensure that
workers adequately process the information that they receive, in
part so that they do not falsely conclude that they are relatively
immune from statistical risks.'27 Congress might require the agency
to supplement disclosure requirements in two different ways. First,
120
Thus Viscusi, supra note 46, at 3-14, emphasizes the value of balancing via costbenefit analysis, while McGarity and Shapiro, supra note 15, at 293-304, argue for
more aggressive regulation.
12,See Archon Fung et al., Full Disclosure 35-49 (2007).
122Rose-Ackerman, supra note 17, at 358.
12 On wage premiums, see W. Kip Viscusi, Risk by Choice 37-58 (1983).
24Note that the agency does have a "hazard communication" policy, which requires disclosure in certain circumstances. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (2007). For discussion, see Hazard
Communication Policy, http://www.ehrs.columbia.edu/HazardCommunicationPolicy.html
(last visited June 1, 2008).
"zSee Cass R. Sunstein, Risk and Reason 254-66 (2002).
126See George A. Akerlof & William T. Dickens, The Economic Consequences
of
Cognitive Dissonance, in George A. Akerlof, An Economic Theorist's Book of Tales
123, 123-28 (1984).
127For a relevant discussion, see Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge 3133 (2008).
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it might impose clear bans on risks that reasonable employees
would not be willing to run." Second, it might ban employers from
exposing employees to certain risks when the monetized benefits of
the ban outweigh the monetized costs,129 in a variation on the approach of the Safe Drinking Water Act.
Very plausibly, however, a strict cost-benefit test is not appropriate in this context. Distributional considerations matter. For example, it is imaginable that an $800 million cost would be justified
for a benefit of $700 million in increased safety-if the cost was
borne mostly by consumers and if the expenditure saved 100 lives a
year. Even if the monetized costs exceed the monetized benefits
under standard assumptions about valuation, 3 ' it is reasonable to
think that the agency should proceed. Perhaps the welfare effects
of the regulation are desirable, on balance, whatever the monetized
analysis suggests. Perhaps the welfare gains to workers, in terms of
safety, exceed the overall welfare losses to employers, customers,
and workers who might find themselves with reduced wages or
without jobs. Monetary measures are based on willingness to pay,
and it is possible that the welfare gain is greater than the welfare
loss even if the monetized costs are greater than the monetized
benefits. Even if this point does not hold, perhaps the regulation
would be justified on redistributive grounds. If workers gain a great
deal in terms of safety, perhaps the agency should proceed even if
others (employers, consumers) lose more than workers gain.
Of course, it is conventional to think that the best way to handle
distributive considerations is through the tax system. Many people
believe that the intended beneficiaries would be better off with a
cash payment than with a regulatory requirement. 31 It is possible
that mandatory safety regulations will result in reduced wages and
decreased employment, 32 and if so, it is not clear that workers as a
whole will benefit from such regulations. Perhaps the losses in
terms of wages and employment opportunities exceed the gains in
Rose-Ackerman, supra note 17, at 359.
,2942 U.S.C. § 300(g)(b)(3)(C) (2000).
"For discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, Valuing Life: A Plea for Disaggregation, 54
'See

Duke L.J. 385, 396-400 (2004).
,3,On some of the complexities here, see id. at 436-39.
32or a relevant discussion about the relationship between employment regulations
and wage levels, see Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 223,
225-30 (2000).
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terms of safety. To know, we need to learn something about the incidence of the various costs. If redistribution is the goal, the tax
system is the preferred means. But at least it can be said that an occupational safety regulation might have desirable redistributive
consequences, especially if workers lack information. If it does, the
agency might legitimately take those consequences into account.
Under a view that has roots in Justice Powell's opinion in
American Petroleum, the agency should be required to show a
"reasonable relationship" between benefits and costs; distributional considerations and concerns about equity might overcome
what would follow from a strictly monetary test.' It is important to
know who bears the costs and who enjoys the benefits, not merely
the magnitude of both of these. But my primary goal here is not to
specify what Congress should require the agency to consider. It is
instead to suggest that there could be real value in democratic engagement with that question, especially in light of the relevant
learning in the last decades. One argument for use of the nondelegation doctrine-or perhaps it is a mere hope"--is that invalidation of the statute might produce a better, more informed occupational safety law.
2. Of Significant and InsignificantRisks
If possible, courts should avoid the heavy constitutional artillery,
simply because of the disruption that invalidation would cause and
because of the many problems with judicial use of the nondelegation doctrine.135 The least aggressive approach would build on both

the agency's current practices and on Justice Breyer's opinion in
American Trucking so as to create floors and ceilings on agency action. A central claim here would be that courts should construe the
disputed provision so as to avoid constitutional doubts-a principle
that would, in this context, call for an interpretation that would
limit agency discretion. A reasonable interpretation along these
lines ought to produce a band within which agency outcomes must
fall. There are three major points here.

"3See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,735-36 (Oct. 4, 1993) (referring to both distributive impacts and equity).
" See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 18, at 1743-54.
135See supra note 18.
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The first is that after American Petroleum, we know that the
agency must establish that it is seeking to regulate a "significant"
risk. It is not permitted to conclude that a standard is "reasonably
necessary or appropriate" if the risk is trivial. A judgment about
the significance of a risk would call for an assessment of both the
magnitude and the probability of harm. If, for example, an industry
practice exposes hundreds of thousands of workers to a 1-in-1000
risk of mortality or serious injury, the risk unquestionably qualifies
as significant. As the exposed population becomes smaller, the
probability decreases, and the magnitude of the harm drops, it is
harder to categorize the risk as "significant." As several courts
have held, some risks are not above the relevant floor. 36' In this respect, OSHA does overlap with the Clean Air Act provision at issue in American Trucking. The latter provision forbids regulations
that are not "requisite to protect the public health" and thus bans
the agency from imposing restrictions on trivial risks. The Court
has made clear that OSHA has a similar requirement: the Secretary of Labor may not proceed unless the risk reaches a certain
threshold. 137
The second point is that the agency is not permitted to ignore a
significant risk.138 If the agency imposes no regulation, or an inexplicably weak regulation, it has failed to do what is "reasonably
necessary or appropriate." Indeed, the agency might well be subject to judicial review if it fails to respond to a petition to produce a
rule dealing with a substantial safety problem. "9 If the agency refuses to address a significant risk, it had better explain itself."4 Indeed, the Supreme Court held, in Massachusetts v. EPA, that any
such explanation must be rooted in the statutory text.14 ' To this extent, OSHA is analogous to the Clean Air Act; just as the agency
cannot be too draconian, so too it cannot be too lenient. In both
contexts, there are both floors and ceilings on agency action. Like
the "requisite to protect the public health" language, the require36
"'
See, e.g., AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 980 (11th Cir. 1992).
,31See Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 639-40 (1980).
" Cf. Am. Lung Ass'n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (requiring EPA to
explain failure to issue short-term standard for asthmatics in light of evidence that risk
was substantial).
131 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127
S. Ct. 1438, 1459 (2007).
'40 Id. at 1462.

Id.

141
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ment of a "significant risk" forbids the agency from being draconian; and in both contexts, the statutory terms, taken in context,
forbid the agency from being too lenient, even to the extent of
permitting judicial review of agency inaction. It is true the words
"reasonably" and "appropriate" soften OSHA in ways that the
word "requisite" does not. But if the agency ignores a significant
risk or fails to eliminate such a risk, it is required to offer a good
explanation, made out in terms of statutorily relevant factors.
The third point is that "feasibility" operates as a constraint on
what the agency might do or require. 42 As we have seen, the term
itself is not self-defining, but it is at least somewhat helpful to say
that the agency may not require actions that are neither technically
nor economically feasible. Without this constraint, which is clearly
imposed on agency regulation of toxic substances, the nondelegation problem would be more serious. True, a statute that forces an
agency to regulate even if regulation is not feasible would limit
agency discretion. But if an agency is permitted to decide whether
to impose a feasibility constraint or not, it would seem to lack an
intelligible principle by which to decide what to do.
The conclusion that the constraints of feasibility must be respected is less than obvious because the "reasonably necessary or
appropriate" language does not by itself constrain the agency in
this way; that language lacks a feasibility limitation. Perhaps the
agency could deem a restriction "reasonably necessary," if the risk
is large enough, even if regulation would create serious economic
dislocations.
But there are two problems with this argument. The first is that a
regulation might well be considered neither "reasonably necessary" nor "appropriate" if it would not be economically or technologically feasible. A restriction that would cause massive business
failures would not seem to be "appropriate." By itself, this argument may not be decisive,' but an argument from statutory structure strongly supports this conclusion. Note that the more aggressive toxic substances provision, governing health standards,

See, e.g., AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 980-82 (11th Cir. 1992).
,4' Cf. Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that
feasibility does not constrain the EPA's authority to issue national ambient air quality
standards).
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contains an explicit feasibility limitation." It would be odd indeed
to construe the less stringent and more general definitional clause
not to include the same limitation. In view of this statutory structure, requiring health standards to be "feasible," it makes sense to
say that safety standards must be feasible as well. As I have emphasized, the idea of feasibility is far from self-defining, and inevitably it leaves a great deal of discretion to the agency. But, that degree of discretion does not create a serious constitutional issue.
Are these three limitations, taken as a whole, sufficient to save
the statute against a nondelegation challenge? Probably, but the
answer is not entirely obvious. If an intelligible principle is required, floors and ceilings may not be enough; we might also need
some principle to tell us how to choose between the floor and the
ceiling. As the court of appeals observed in UAW I,145 the three

principles leave the agency with considerable discretion on a crucial issue: stringency.
Suppose that the agency decided to regulate a significant risk to
the maximum point, that is, the point of feasibility. Apparently,
that decision would satisfy the statutory requirements. By contrast,
suppose that the agency decided to regulate a significant risk only
slightly. Perhaps that decision would be unlawful if it allowed a
significant risk to remain. But what if the agency decided to regulate a significant risk, not to the point of feasibility, but to the extent justified by a strict cost-benefit test? In other words, suppose
that the agency concluded that a regulation of a significant risk was
"reasonably necessary or appropriate" only if the benefits exceeded the costs. At first glance, that approach would be consistent
with the statute as well-but would not be mandatory. And the fact
that the agency would have unfettered discretion to choose between "significant risk/feasibility" and "significant risk/cost-benefit
balancing," might seem to doom the statute on constitutional
grounds.
The best response is that this degree of discretion, while substantial, does not amount to a blank check. The three principles outlined above are sufficiently intelligible and constraining to overcome the constitutional objection. To those who reject this

U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2000).
' UAW v. OSHA (UAW II), 37 F.3d 665,668-69 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

"429

45
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response but want to avoid invalidation, there is a remaining option.
3. Cost-Benefit Analysis
The third option would require some form of cost-benefit analysis under the theory that the statutory text mandates it. Under the
statutory phrase "reasonably necessary or appropriate," perhaps
the agency cannot proceed unless it has assessed both costs and
benefits and shown that the latter justify the former, at least in the
sense that the benefits are roughly proportional to the costs. Substantial costs might be justified if they would ensure substantial
benefits, even if a strict monetary test suggested that the costs exceeded the benefits. But a lack of inquiry into the actual effects of
regulation and a failure to demonstrate a degree of proportionality
would be fatal to the regulation.
It is easy to see the form that such a ruling might take. As the
court of appeals suggested in UAW I, the statute uses the term
"reasonably necessary," and the adverb might well call for a form
of balancing.146 We have seen that the word "reasonably" distinguishes OSHA from the Clean Air Act provisions governing national ambient air quality standards, which use the unmodified
term "requisite." The words "or appropriate" strengthen the argument. Taken as a whole, the statutory phrase "reasonably necessary or appropriate" might well be taken to suggest a general reasonableness standard, one that requires benefits to justify costs.
Courts of appeals have taken a similar approach in the context of
disability discrimination. While not imposing a strict cost-benefit
test, courts interpret the term "reasonable accommodation" in that
context as requiring a plaintiff to show that the costs of an accommodation would not be disproportionate to the benefits.147 In the
context of OSHA, such a construction would have the additional
benefit of eliminating the nondelegation problem. If courts can
construe the statutory language in such a way as to avoid that problem, they should do exactly that.
The strongest objection to this construction is that the statute
does not unambiguously require it, and under established doctrine,
UAW v. OSHA (UAW I), 938 F.2d 1310, 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
"' See, e.g., Vande Zande v. Wisconsin, 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995).
"6

HeinOnline -- 94 Va. L. Rev. 1438 2008

2008]

Is OSHA Unconstitutional?

1439

an agency is permitted to interpret statutory ambiguities as it reasonably sees fit. 148 The best response is that this principle is
trumped by the Avoidance Canon: agencies cannot construe statutes in such a way as to raise serious constitutional objections.'4 9

Suppose that we are tempted to conclude that unless the Avoidance Canon is invoked, the statute allows the agency to choose between an approach that requires cost-benefit balancing and an approach that does not. The problem is that under this approach, the
nondelegation problem would reemerge. One solution to that
problem is to hold that "reasonably necessary or appropriate" requires and does not merely permit cost-benefit balancing. It is true,
of course, that the Avoidance Canon requires some intelligible
principle, and that cost-benefit balancing is only one candidate;
floors and ceilings, of the kind described above, are the primary alternative.
We shall shortly see that such balancing has significant advantages. For the moment, it will be useful to see how the agency's
safety regulations fit within the universe of federal regulations protecting against mortality risks. 5°

U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984).
141 See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738-39 (2006) (plurality opinion); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 503-05 (9th
Cir. 2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Whitaker v.
Thompson, 353 F.3d 947,952 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting that the Avoidance Canon only
trumps Chevron deference where there is "a comparatively high likelihood of unconstitutionality, or at least some exceptional intricacy of constitutional doctrine"); AFLCIO v. FEC, 333 F.3d 168, 175 (D.C. Cir. 2003). But see Morales-Izquierdo, 486 F.3d
at 492-93 (denial of rehearing en banc) ("When Congress has explicitly or implicitly
left a gap for an agency to fill, and the agency has filled it, we have no authority to reconstrue the statute, even to avoid potential constitutional problems .... ").
50The data in this table is taken from two articles: Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock, Has Economic Analysis Improved Regulatory Decisions?, 22 J. Econ. Persp. 67,
76 (2008); John F. Morrall, Saving Lives: A Review of the Record, 27 J. Risk & Uncertainty 221, 230-31 (2003).
48Chevron
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Table 1
Data on Cost per Statistical Life Saved
Cost per
statistical

Regulation

Agency

Year

Category

life saved
(millions of

2002 $)
Electrical Safety

OSHA-S

1990

Safety

0.1

Childproof Lighters

CPSC

1993

Safety

0.1

Logging Operations

OSHA-S

1994

Safety

0.1

Respiratory Protection

OSHA-H

1998

Other

0.1

Steering Column Protection

NHTSA

1967

Safety

0.2

Unvented Space Heaters

CPSC

1980

Safety

0.2

Safety Standards for Scaffolds

OSHA-S

1996

Safety

0.2

Trihalomethanes

EPA

1979

Toxin control

0.3

Cabin Fire Protections

FAA

1985

Safety

0.3

Organ Procurement

HHS

1998

Other

0.3

AED on Large Planes

FAA

2001

Other

0.3

Food Labeling

FDA

1993

Other

0.4

Electrical Power Generation

OSHA-S

1994

Safety

0.4

Breaking/Trucks

NHTSA

1995

Safety

0.4

Mammography Standards

HHS

1997

Other

0.4

Fuel System Integrity

NHTSA

1975

Safety

0.5

Underground Construction

OSHA-S

1983

Safety

0.5

Passive Restraints

NHTSA

1984

Safety

0.5

Head Impact Protection

NHTSA

1995

Safety

0.7

Servicing Wheel Rims

OSHA-S

1984

Safety

0.9

Alcohol and Drug Control

FRA

1985

Safety

0.9

Trucks

NHTSA

1999

Safety

0.9

Seat Cushion Flammability

FAA

1984

Safety

1

Side Impact and Autos

NHTSA

1990

Safety

1.1

Medical Devices

FDA

1996

Other

1.1

Floor Emergency Lighting

FAA

1984

Safety

1.2

form

OSHA-S

1984

Safety

1.5

Low-Altitude Windshear

FAA

1988

Safety

1.8

Stability and Control During

Reflective Devices for Heavy

Crane Suspended Personnel Plat-
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Cost per
statistical

Agency

Regulation

Year

Category

life saved
(millions of

2002 $)
Electrical Equipment sts/Metal
MSHA

1970

Safety

1.9

Avoidance

FAA

1988

Safety

2.1

Trenching and Excavation

OSHA-S

1989

Safety

2.1

Side Doors

NHTSA

1970

Safety

2.2

CPSC

1973

Safety

2.2

tion

OSHA-S

1985

Safety

2.4

Confined Spaces

OSHA-S

1993

Safety

2.5

Hazard Communication

OSHA-S

1983

Safety

3.1

Child Restraints

NHTSA

1999

Safety

3.3

Benzene/Fugitive Emissions

EPA

1984

Toxin control

3.7

Rear/Up/Shoulder Belts/Autos
Tire Pressure Monitoring Sys-

NHTSA

1989

Safety

4.4

tems

DOT

2005

Safety

4.8

Asbestos

OSHA-H

1972

Toxin control

5.5

EDB Drinking Water

EPA

1991

Toxin control

6

NO, SIP Call

EPA

1998

Other

6

Occupant Crash Protection
Benzene/Revised: Coke Byprod-

DOT-NHTSA

2004

Safety

6.3

Mines
Traffic Alert and Collision

Children's Sleepwear Flammabil-

ity
Concrete and Masonry Construc-

ucts

EPA

1988

Toxin control

6.4

Radionuclides/Uranium mines

EPA

1984

Toxin control

6.9

Roadway Worker Protection

FRA

1997

Safety

7.1

Contaminants Monitoring

EPA

2001

Toxin control

8.2

Grain Dust

OSHA-S

1988

Safety

11

MSHA

1970

Safety

13

Methylene Chloride

OSHA-H

1997

Toxin control

13

Arsenic/Glass paint

EPA

1986

Toxin control

19

Arsenic and Clarifications to
Compliance and New Source

Electrical Equipment Standards/Metal Mines
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Cost per
statistical

Regulation

Agency

Year

Category

life saved
(millions of
2002 $)

Benzene

OSHA-H

1987

Toxin control

22

Arsenic/Copper smelter

EPA

1986

Toxin control

27

Uranium Mill Tailings/Inactive

EPA

1983

Toxin control

28

Petroleum Sludge

EPA

1990

Toxin control

29

Acrylonitrile

OSHA-H

1978

Toxin control

31

erations

EPA

1990

Toxin control

35

4.4 methlyenedianiline

OSHA-H

1992

Toxin control

36

Phase I1

EPA

1991

Toxin control

50

Coke Ovens

OSHA-H

1976

Toxin control

51

Uranium Mill Tailings/Active

EPA

1983

Toxin control

53

Asbestos

OSHA-H

1986

Toxin control

66

Asbestos/Construction

OSHA

1994

Toxin control

71

Arsenic

OSHA-H

1978

Toxin control

77

Asbestos Ban

EPA

1989

Toxin control

78

Ethylene Oxide

OSHA-H

1984

Toxin control

80

Lockout/ Tagout

OSHA-S

1989

Safety

98

ment/Wood Products

EPA

1990

Toxin control

140

DES (Cattlefeed)

FDA

1979

Toxin control

170

tions

EPA

1990

Toxin control

180

Land Disposal Restrictions

EPA

1990

Toxin control

530

Sewage Sludge Disposal

EPA

1993

Toxin control

530

Hazardous Waste: Solids Dioxin

EPA

1986

Toxin control

560

Prohibit Land Disposal

EPA

1988

Toxin control

1100

tions/Phase II

EPA

1994

Toxin control

2600

Drinking Water: Phase II

EPA

1992

Toxin control

19,000

Formaldehyde

OSHA-H

1987

Toxin control

78,000

Hazardous Wastes Listing for

Benzene/Revised: Transfer Op-

Nat. Primary & Secondary
Drinking Water Regulations

Hazardous Waste Manage-

Benzene/Revised: Waste Opera-

Land Disposal Restric-
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Category

Cost per
statistical
life saved
(millions of
2002$)

Toxin control

100,000

What is striking about the OSHA's safety rules is the variability
in cost per life saved-from a low of $100,000 (a real bargain) to a
high of $98 million (well above the standard figure, within the federal government, of around $6 million 51 ). The fact that OSHA
safety regulations are concentrated toward the lower end of the
range suggests the possibility of further opportunities for lifesaving regulations.
To be sure, these particular figures should be taken with many
grains of salt, among other things because they do not include savings short of mortalities averted.152 The only point is that a glimpse
at the figures shows significant and apparently inexplicable variability across safety regulations. Cost-benefit analysis might well
help to increase sense and coherence. If conducted properly and
given appropriate weight, it might well help workers themselves,
because expensive regulation is likely to produce decreases in
wages, in jobs, or both. It is a serious mistake to act as if workers'
interests invariably favor more aggressive safety regulation; workers may lose in wages and job opportunities what they gain in
safety. The relationship among regulations, wages, and employment presents an array of theoretical and empirical challenges."l3
Of course, any cost-benefit approach leaves some crucial questions unanswered. Hard-line enthusiasts for the nondelegation doctrine might object that those questions are so large that costbenefit analysis, in the abstract, itself raises nondelegation concerns. What is the appropriate valuation of a statistical risk of mor-

151
152

See Sunstein, supra note 28, at 132.
For a general discussion of difficulties with tables of this kind, see Lisa Heinzer-

ling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 Yale L.J. 1981, 1983-86 (1998).
'3 The best discussion of the general issue remains Jolls, supra note 132, at 225-30.
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tality?1 14 Should a statistical life be valued at $1 million, $6 million,
$10 million, or $30 million? How should the agency value the thousands of injuries, falling short of mortality, that come from workplace accidents? Independent of the question of valuation, must
the agency follow a strict cost-benefit test, in accordance with
which regulations are banned if the monetary costs outweigh the
monetary benefits? Or should the agency be permitted to give
weight as well to distributional factors? That is, could it allow costs
to exceed benefits because employers and their customers would
bear the former, whereas employees would enjoy the latter?
To require a reasonable relationship between costs and benefits,
it is not necessary for courts to answer such questions. In light of
the worker-protective goals of OSHA, surely it would be legitimate
and perhaps mandatory to take account of redistributive goals155
and to proceed if workers would be significantly benefited and if
the costs would be at least proportionate to that benefit. The
agency should therefore be required to show, not that a regulation
satisfies a strict cost-benefit test, but that the costs have a reasonable relationship to the benefits. If the monetized costs exceed the
monetized benefits, the agency should be permitted to proceed so
long as there is such a relationship between the two. Recall that
even if a safety regulation fails a cost-benefit test by standard
measures, it might produce net welfare benefits. We have seen that
those standard measures involve "willingness to pay, ' and they
are only a crude measure of welfare effects. 57 What matters is welfare, not monetized willingness to pay. The agency could well decide that a rule would have desirable welfare effects even if the
monetized benefits were lower than the monetized costs.

154

For relevant discussion, see Viscusi, supra note 46, at 17-33; Sunstein, supra note

130, at 386-96.
155 On some of the complexities here, see Rose-Ackerman, supra note 17, at 357-58.
As I have noted, it is incorrect to proceed as if an occupational safety standard automatically transfers resources from employers to employees. In all probability, employees will themselves bear some of the relevant costs, as for example through decreased wages and fewer employment opportunities. For an illuminating discussion of
the relationship between employment regulations and wage levels, see Jolls, supra
note 132 at 225-30.
156See Adler & Posner, supra note 6, at 159-61; Viscusi, supra note 46, at 19-22.
157 See Adler & Posner, supra note 6, at 166-75.
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To be sure, authority to consider distributive goals increases the
discretion given to the agency, but so long as the benefits and costs
must be shown to be proportional, the constitutional problem is
not serious. I have emphasized that a cost-benefit approach to
workplace safety regulations would raise many questions, but one
of the advantages of that approach is that it would force the agency
to ask and answer those questions in public. In addition, a proportionality test would have the advantage of fitting plausibly well
with the agency's own practice, both in terms of its conclusions and
its standard rationale."' We have seen that the agency typically
strives to account for both costs and benefits and that, in general, a
reasonable relationship seems to exist between the two. The problem is that without the pressure of legal constraint, the agency's inquiry into costs and benefits is ad hoc and undisciplined and produces some of the variability captured in Table 1. A cost-benefit
construction, of the sort suggested here, would ensure greater
transparency and regularity. It would also have the advantage of
promoting greater clarity and monitoring of agency discretion by
increasing the likelihood that when the agency chooses one degree
of stringency rather than another its judgment can be scrutinized in
public.
C. Of Narrowing Constructionsand SubsidiaryPolicymaking: A
Puzzle and a Clarification
There is a final puzzle, and it raises a large issue with respect to
the relationship between courts and the administrative state. The
issue involves the status of narrowly construing agency discretion
to avoid nondelegation challenges.'59 Such narrowing constructions
are not uncommon, 6 ' and I have suggested that the cost-benefit
approach is best justified as an example. But the whole approach
raises a serious question. The problem is that if, as American
Trucking teaches, agencies cannot rescue open-ended delegations
through subsidiary policymaking in the guise of interpretation,

,5 See supra Subsection II.A.1.
59or

an illuminating and detailed treatment, see Manning, supra note 36, at 223-

28.
" Many courts have followed this approach. See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters
v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 748 (D.D.C. 1971).
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courts should not be able to do so either.16' The question therefore
arises: what is the status of the Avoidance Canon, in the specific
context of a nondelegation challenge, in the aftermath of American
Trucking?
At first glance, nothing in American Trucking should endanger
the use of the Avoidance Canon. The Court's suggestion was
merely that if a statute does confer open-ended authority on an
agency, the agency cannot eliminate that problem by deciding how
much discretion to exercise.
The idea that an agency can cure an unconstitutionally standardless delegation of power by declining to exercise some of that
power seems to us internally contradictory. The very choice of
which portion of the power to exercise-that is to say, the prescription of the standard that Congress had omitted-would itself
be an exercise of the forbidden legislative authority."
The new nondelegation doctrine, repudiated by American Trucking, asked agencies to develop "subsidiary policy" by which to discipline their discretion under open-ended statutes. The reason for
the repudiation of the new doctrine is that the development of subsidiary policy counts as an exercise of discretion. It is not "interpretation."
If American Trucking is understood in this way, it certainly suggests that courts cannot rescue a statute from a nondelegation challenge if they are themselves making subsidiary policy. But when a
court (or for that matter an agency) is legitimately selecting an interpretation that narrows agency discretion, it is not really making
subsidiary policy. Instead, a court that properly uses the Avoidance
Canon is relying on standard legal materials to hold that, of two or
more plausible interpretations of a text, the agency is bound by the
one that gives it limited rather than open-ended authority.
To be sure, an approach of this kind would not be legitimate if
the standard legal materials left both court and agency at sea-if
the narrower interpretation really is policymaking and does not
qualify as an interpretation at all. But if courts can fairly insist on
that interpretation as a reasonable way of coming to terms with

,6,See Manning, supra note 36, at 246-53.
62Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457,473 (2001).
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what Congress has actually said, then American Trucking creates
no obstacle. 63'
Here, then, is a possible problem with the approaches I have
outlined. Suppose that the relevant interpretation is really an exercise in policymaking-that courts are choosing an intelligible principle not on the basis of anything that Congress has done but as a
means of implementing a policy of the judges' own choosing. Under American Trucking, the "floors and ceilings" approach and the
cost-benefit approach would not cure the nondelegation problem if
they amounted to judicial policymaking. But I have argued that
both approaches are legitimate readings of the legal materials in
light of the Avoidance Canon. If this argument is correct, then judicial insistence on one or another does not run afoul of the
Court's rejection of the new nondelegation doctrine.
CONCLUSION

My goal here has been to explore the meaning and validity of the
principal provision governing occupational safety standards in the
United States. Remarkably, Congress' sole guidance has been to
tell the Secretary of Labor to do whatever is "reasonably necessary
or appropriate" to provide safe and healthful places of employment. The leading court of appeals decision upholds this provision
on the ground that the agency has developed subsidiary policy by
which to limit its own discretion. After American Trucking, however, this route is unavailable.
In these circumstances, courts have three options. The most aggressive is to invalidate the statute on constitutional grounds. Notwithstanding its disruptive potential, this route does not entirely
lack appeal. Especially in view of the sheer amount of information
that has accumulated over the last decades, Congress should be expected to do much better than to instruct the Secretary of Labor to
do what he deems "reasonably necessary or appropriate." Invalidation of the statute might well have a democracy-forcing function,
63There

is an issue in the background here. Suppose that the legal materials would

permit two reasonable interpretations, A and B, both of which are highly constrained.
If the agency picks A, is there a nondelegation problem? On the standard approach,
the answer is negative. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984). In general, the agency's discretion to choose among two reasonable interpretations does not create a "blank check."
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one that would spur a degree of national deliberation about how
best to protect American workers from hazards faced in the workplace. Such deliberation could well produce a greatly improved
statute, one that would benefit from a great deal of theoretical and
empirical work since OSHA was first enacted." And however aggressive, this approach would be less radical than it might seem. No
other federal regulatory statute confers so much discretion on federal administrators, at least in any area with such broad scope, and
it is not difficult to distinguish OSHA from statutes that the Court
has upheld.
The least aggressive option, grounded in the Avoidance Canon,
is to parse the statutory language to create floors and ceilings on
agency action. The central argument here is that the agency may
not regulate trivial risks (as held in American Petroleum), ignore
significant risks, or regulate beyond the point of feasibility. Thus
interpreted, is OSHA unconstitutional? The question is not entirely easy to answer. On the one hand, the agency would have a
limited band of operation: the floors and ceilings would reduce its
room to maneuver. And if this interpretation were taken to ban the
agency from making its decisions on the basis of cost-benefit analysis, then the delegation in OSHA would provide constraints similar
to those the Clean Air Act, as upheld in American Trucking.
The problem is that, at a minimum, the "reasonably necessary or
appropriate" language seems to permit the agency to decide
whether to choose cost-benefit analysis as the basis for its decisions. The question then becomes: If the agency is given the discretion to choose between (a) cost-benefit analysis or (b) an approach
based on significant risk/feasibility, is there a violation of the nondelegation doctrine? Would the agency's power to choose between
(a) and (b) suggest that Congress gave it a blank check in violation
of American Trucking? Probably not, but reasonable people might
disagree about how to answer that question.
The third and best possibility, also grounded in the Avoidance
Canon, would be to construe the statute to require some kind of
cost-benefit balancing, rooted in a minimal requirement of proportionality between costs and benefits. This approach would have the
virtue of permitting the Secretary of Labor to decide exactly what
" See supra notes 119-29.
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cost-benefit analysis entails in the distinctive context of occupational safety. The Secretary would have the power to assign values
to mortality and morbidity effects and to give significant weight to
considerations of equity and fair distribution.
From a strictly doctrinal point of view, an evident advantage of
this approach is that it would fit well with the statutory language
while also eliminating the constitutional problem. And from the
standpoint of sound policy, a proportionality requirement would
also have the virtue of increasing the transparency of occupational
safety law by ensuring, for the first time, that the key choices are
explained in a way that is subject to public scrutiny and review.'65

1' For those who believe that cost-benefit analysis undermines transparency, this
argument will of course not be convincing. See Heinzerling & Ackerman, supra note
46, at 8-9. For a different view, see Sunstein, supra note 125, at 291-93.
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